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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how changes in house prices affect the timing of when eligible 
individuals decide to start receiving Social Security Retirement Income (SSRI).  As changes 
in the price of housing and SSRI withdrawal decisions are likely to be correlated with 
unobserved local demand shocks, we employ an instrumental variables strategy using the 
land supply elasticity of an MSA interacted with changes in the national housing price index 
as an instrument for the value of a home.  We find that an increase in the value of a home 
causes elderly individuals to delay SSRI claiming once they are eligible during the housing 
boom period, but we do not find a statistically significant impact on the claim decision during 
the bust period.  Our findings highlight the potential channel of cashing out home equity in 
replace of receiving SSRI early for seniors to finance retirement during the housing boom 
period.  
 
Key words: Social Security Retirement Income (SSRI); housing wealth shock; land supply 
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1. Introduction  
It is widely recognized that the United States, like many other countries, is moving into an aging 
society.  The proportion of individuals over the age of 65 in the U.S. rose from 8% in 1950 to 13% 
in 2010 and is expected to rise to over 20% by 2030 as the Baby Boomer generation continues to 
age (Lee, 2014).  The rapid increase in the share of the elderly population is something policy 
makers are cognizant of, as it raises concerns regarding the financial readiness of the retirement 
system for a dramatic increase in individuals filing for Social Security.  Among the various 
sources of financial assets of the elderly, Social Security Retirement Income (SSRI) and home 
equity are the two largest components of an elderly household’s balance sheet.1  Therefore, a 
better understanding of how elderly households utilize these assets has become increasingly 
important when designing policy.  
 This paper studies the extent to which elderly households make decisions on financing 
retirement using SSRI and housing equity.  Elderly individuals who need additional wealth and 
are at the eligible age to receive Social Security can choose to start receiving SSRI.  However, if 
these individuals start receiving SSRI as soon as they become eligible, the monthly benefit is 
lower than if the individual delayed a few years. 2  We examine if elderly individuals are more 
likely to start receiving SSRI later when house prices increase.  In other words, our research 
examines the trade-off between these two assets, as elderly individuals may choose to draw upon 
their home equity and delay receiving SSRI benefits when the value of their house increases.  
                                                          
1
 Retirement support includes pensions, housing equity, financial equity, and other savings. Social security 
retirement income and home equity are the two largest components of household balance sheet, especially for the 
bottom two-thirds of the wealth distribution for households aged 65-69 (Poterba 2014). 
2
 Sixty two is the age when individuals become eligible to receive SSRI. Sixty five is generally considered as the full 
retirement age (varies slightly across cohorts).  If individuals delay receiving SSRI from 62 to 65, for example, the 
benefit level as a percent of the primary insurance amount would rise from 80% to 100% accordingly.  We will 
describe the specifics of the program and how the benefits vary based on the age individuals start to claim SSRI later 
in the paper. 
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Studying this issue will allow us to gain a better understanding of the substitutability of these two 
assets as a source of income for the aged population.  The implications of our research are 
important for policy makers, as our findings will aid in designing suitable policies to help the 
rising number of senior citizens adjust to fluctuations in the price of housing. 
 We focus on the role of home equity to finance retirement life due to the rising 
importance of home equity in the investment portfolio of the elderly.  Based on the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the average ratio of home equity to total household 
net worth was 36.07% in 2005 for individuals under the age of 35 and this ratio increased to 
more than 45% as individuals reach 65 years old (shown in Figure 1). Due to the fact that the 
elderly had a larger amount of home equity prior to the Great Recession, they suffered a more 
substantial decrease in total assets after the decline in real estate prices in 2007 (also shown in 
Figure 1).  The deterioration in home equity likely impacts elderly individuals directly through 
the wealth effect and indirectly through the home equity-based borrowing channel (Mian, Rao, 
and Sufi, 2013).  The latter implies that a decline in house values reduces the ability and amount 
that the elderly can receive through home equity loans to finance their retirement expenses. 
 For senior citizens, one way to supplement income if there is a decline in house value is 
to adjust when they start receiving SSRI.  Individuals are eligible to receive SSRI at the early 
retirement age of 62.  However, they may choose to delay the withdrawal decision to the full 
retirement age3 since delaying the receipt of benefits will increase the amount received in each 
pay check.  Research has shown that there are peaks in Social Security benefits claiming at the 
beginning of the eligibility age and the full retirement age (Behaghel and Blau, 2012). During the 
                                                          
3
 Full retirement age varies between 65 and 66, depending on when the individual was born. But social health 
insurance, Medicare, which provides benefits for Americans aged 65 and older, may also be a factor that affects the 
decision to retire at age 65 (Madrian, Burtless, and Gruber, 1994; Rust and Phelan, 1997; Blau and Gilleskie, 2006 
and 2008; French and Jones, 2011). 
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housing boom period from 2000 to 2006, the take-up rate4 at the age 62 declined from 45% to 
38%. The early take-up rate rose again to 42% in 2009 during the housing bust period (Coe and 
Rutledge, 2012). These statistics suggest that elderly individuals are more likely to delay 
receiving Social Security when housing appreciates in value and may start to withdraw early 
when experiencing housing market downturns. 
 However, there are likely to be endogeneity issues present when considering interactions 
between housing wealth and SSRI withdrawal decisions. Specifically, there may be unobserved 
local demand shocks that are correlated with changes in house prices that also affect when an 
elderly individual decides to start receiving SSRI.  For example, when house prices decline in an 
area, it is likely that the local economy is experiencing a negative demand shock in both the labor 
market and housing market.  Therefore, this shock may affect the labor market opportunities and 
the income of elderly households, which will affect the likelihood of claiming SSRI, while 
simultaneously affecting local house prices. 
 To address this endogeneity problem, we utilize an instrumental variables strategy.  We 
draw upon geographic variation in the land supply elasticity of an MSA, developed by Saiz 
(2010), as the topological characteristics of an area are not likely to be correlated with local 
demand shocks to the economy.  We interact this supply elasticity measure with the change in 
the national house price index and use this interaction term as an instrument for the change in 
local house prices.  Our identifying assumption is that the cross-sectional variation in local house 
prices from the national average is driven by differences in local land supply elasticities, which is 
not correlated with time-varying local economic activity.5   
                                                          
4
 The ratio of new claimants at the end of the year to the eligible individuals who had not claimed at the beginning of 
the year. 
5
 This instrument has been used previously in the literature by Mian and Sufi (2011), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar 
(2012), Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013), and Cvijanović (2014). 
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 We find that larger increases in house prices are associated with delayed SSRI claiming 
during the boom period from 2002-2006.  During the bust period from 2007-2009, we do not 
find a statistically significant effect on SSRI claiming, which is consistent with the idea that the 
cashing-out of home equity is only a viable channel to finance retirement when house prices 
appreciate. Specifically, we find that if the housing value increases by 10% in the previous two 
years leading to the eligibility year, the probability of claiming SSRI within one year once they 
become eligible reduced by 0.05, and the probability of claiming SSRI within two years reduced 
by 0.06. Our findings are consistent across various specifications. Overall, our results suggest 
that when house prices increase, and thus home equity, elderly individuals delay receipt of SSBI.   
 We have further extended our work to look into the impact of home equity on retirement 
decisions.6 We find that larger increases in house prices are associated with earlier retirement 
during the boom period.  Similarly, we find that when house prices depreciate during the bust 
period, individuals retire later but the effect is of a smaller magnitude. These results are 
consistent with retirement decisions cycling with market fluctuations potentially due to wealth 
effects.  However, during the market boom period, given the additional channel to cash-out home 
equity, senior citizens tend to be more responsive to the accumulated home equity and are more 
likely to retire early.  We also show that pension eligibility plays a role in the impact of house 
price appreciation on retirement decisions. 
 Our research contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the trade-off that elderly 
households make when deciding whether to draw upon housing equity in retirement or to start 
receiving Social Security benefits.  The majority of the existing literature has focused primarily 
on the relationship between local labor market shocks and the decision to withdraw SSRI, with 
                                                          
6
 Recent research has studied the relationship between housing wealth and the retirement and/or labor supply 
decision (Ondrich and Falevich, 2016; Zhao and Burge, 2017a; Zhao and Burge, 2017b).  These papers utilize other 
identification strategies, which we will discuss in detail later in the paper. 
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any discussion of home equity being a secondary consideration (Coile and Levine, 2007, 2011a, 
2011b; Goda, Shoven and Slavov, 2011).  Another strand of literature focusing on the role of 
home equity has examined how changes in house prices affects the decision to retire and leave 
the labor market (Disney, Ratcliffe, and Smith, 2015; Farnham and Sevak, 2007; Ondrich and 
Falevich, 2016; Zhao and Burge, 2017a; Zhao and Burge, 2017b).  We expand upon this 
literature by directly drawing a link between how elderly individuals make the decision to start 
receiving SSRI benefits versus using their home equity to finance expenditures.  Previous 
literature has found little evidence that elderly households draw down their housing equity to 
finance their expenses (Venti and Wise 1989, 1991, and 2004; Sheiner and Weil, 1993; Hurd, 
2002).  However, our research conducts analysis separately for boom and bust period and uses a 
more robust identification strategy through an instrumental variables approach to obtain causal 
estimates of the effect of house price fluctuations on the decision to receive SSRI. 
 The rest of the paper will proceed as follows.  Section 2 discusses the institutional details 
of Social Security Retirement Income in the United States, as well as literature related to SSRI 
claiming, retirement, and home equity of the elderly.  We discuss our data in Section 3 and our 
identification strategy is outlined in Section 4.  Section 5 describes our main results and we show 
a series of robustness checks in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Social Security Retirement Income in the United States  
Individuals are eligible to receive SSRI if they have been working for at least ten years and are at 
least 62 years old.7  The amount of Social Security benefits received is based on the worker’s 
average indexed earnings over the highest amount he or she earned over 35 years.  However, the 
                                                          
7
 Originally, workers could not claim SS benefits until the age of 65.  However, in 1962 the program was adopted to 
allow workers to retire at age 62 at a reduced benefit. 
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benefit amount is then adjusted based on when the individual starts receiving SSRI, penalizing 
individuals for claiming before the full retirement age (FRA) of 65. Furthermore, workers can 
receive additional benefits if they delay receiving OASI payments beyond age 65, increasing 
benefits each year with a cap at 70 years old (Song and Manchester, 2007).8   
The Social Security Advisory Board summarizes the decision an elderly individual has to 
make by stating that: “If you withdraw early, you may not have enough income to enjoy the 
years ahead of you. Likewise, if you withdraw late, you’ll have a larger income, but fewer years 
to enjoy it. Everyone needs to find the right balance based on his or her own circumstances” 
(Social Security Advisory Board 2009). The AARP website begins its advice about when to 
claim Social Security benefits with the statement: “If you’re healthy and can afford it, you should 
consider waiting until you reach your full retirement age.”9 
 Several changes were made to the program in 2000.  First, the retirement earnings test, 
which penalized individuals for working while receiving Social Security through lower benefits, 
was removed for individuals who did not receive benefits until after the full retirement age.  The 
second change was that the FRA was increased, based on the year of birth of the individual.  
However, the earliest age at which an individual could receive Social Security remained at 62. In 
this paper, we focus on the decision to withdraw SSRI within one or two years once individuals 
reach 62 years old. 
 In addition to receiving SSRI, individuals may have pension accounts and other 
retirement benefits through their employers.   
 
3. Theoretical Background 
                                                          
8
 There is an ongoing debate regarding whether the penalties for early take-up are actuarially fair.  For more 
information on this literature and debate, see Myers and Schobel (1990) and Goda, Shoven, and Slavov (2012). 
9
 http://www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-12-2010/top-25-social-security-questions.5.html. 
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As Social Security has become an increasingly important policy in the U.S., there has been a 
growing literature examining what affects an individual’s decision to start receiving SSRI, given 
that delaying results in higher benefits.  Crawford and Lilien (1981) have argued that the main 
reason individuals start receiving SSRI is a liquidity constraint, where low-income workers do 
not save enough while working and therefore claim earlier to finance consumption during 
retirement.  Individuals with longer life expectancy also tend to delay claiming SSRI (Munnell 
and Soto, 2005).  Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos (2004) show that subjective assessments of 
mortality risk are associated with early retirement and early claiming.   Behavioral economists 
argue that the decision is affected by the institutional details of Social Security system. Brown, 
Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2011) show that when an individual self-reports that he/she will start 
claiming SSRI depends on the way in which the decision is framed. Other explanations include 
reference dependence with loss aversion, where individuals have a frame regarding when they 
will retire and chose to start claiming at that age, regardless of what may be the optimal strategy 
to maximize lifetime utility (Behaghel and Blau, 2012).  Publically provided health insurance, 
specifically Medicare, may also affect the timing of retirement.  Most workers lose employer-
provided health insurance upon retiring.  Therefore, workers may delay retirement until age 65 
not because of the SSRI benefits, but to ongoing health insurance coverage (Madrian, Burtless, 
and Gruber, 1994; Rust and Phelan, 1997; Blau and Gilleskie, 2006 and 2008; French and Jones, 
2011). 
 However, there is little evidence on the effect of wealth, specifically unexpected shocks 
to wealth, on claiming SSRI. Previous literature examining the impact of wealth shock on elderly 
individuals has mainly focused the decision to retire.  Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) find 
significant labor supply effects of winning the lottery, particularly among individuals aged 55 to 
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65.  Sevaj (2002) exploits the bull market of the 1990s to study the effect of unexpected capital 
gains on retirement timing.  He shows that increases in wealth led to increases in the probability 
of retirement among individuals ages 55 to 60.   
 The decision to retire and the timing of receiving SSRI are intertwined. Hurd and Boskin 
(1981) find that the Social Security benefit increases from 1969 to 1972 can explain a large 
amount of the acceleration of the number of people retiring in that period.  Chan and Stevens 
(2008) find that individuals’ retirement ages respond to pension incentives.  The Social 
Security’s Delayed Retirement Credit raised employment rates among workers over age 65 and 
the Social Security reform in 1983 that increased the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) tended to 
increase the retirement age (Pingle 2006, Mastrobuoni 2009). Coile and Levine (2007) show that 
retirements increase in response to an increase in the unemployment rate, only when workers hit 
age 62, suggesting that access to SSRI benefits may allow older workers to weather the financial 
shock associated with job loss by retiring.  
 A significant segment of the population appears to be income-poor and house-rich 
(Mayer and Simons, 1994; Merrill, Finkel, and Kutty, 1994), so drawing upon housing equity is 
a potentially important source of wealth for the elderly.  Older households have a larger fraction 
of housing equity that they can use to fund home equity loans and obtain reverse mortgages 
(Sinai 2007).  There is an extensive literature examining the relationship between housing wealth 
and consumption and savings decisions (Engelhardt, 1996; Case, Quigley, and Schiller, 2005; 
Jiang, Sun, and Webb, 2011).  A number of more recent papers have examined the effect of 
changes in housing wealth on retirement, but have found mixed results.  Disney, Ratcliffe, and 
Smith (2015) uses data from the United Kingdom to look at cyclical fluctuations in asset prices 
and the labor market on retirements but they find little evidence of any positive wealth effects. 
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However, the authors do not address the endogeneity between housing price and retirement 
decision, possibly causing their estimates to be biased.  Goda, Shoven and Slavov (2011) find no 
effect of housing wealth on the retirement decision during the Great Recession.  However, 
Farnham and Sevak (2007) find that increase in housing wealth is associated with a reduction in 
expected retirement age.   
In this paper, we expand upon the existing literature by using a robust instrument to explore 
the direct substitutability between cashing-out home equity and receiving SSRI benefits with 
extensions to concurrent implications on retirement. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
We are interested in determining the degree to which changes in the value of a home affects the 
decision of an elderly individual to begin to receive SSRI. Recently, the U.S. experienced an 
extreme increase in house price, followed by a dramatic decrease that had never been seen before 
in the country.  We look how the boom period (2002 to 2006), when house prices were 
increasing, affected the timing of beginning to receive SSRI for elderly individuals and the 
timing of retirement.  Then, we look at if there were different effects on these decisions during 
the bust period (2007 to 2009), when house prices dropped dramatically.    
 Specifically, we consider the impact of a percentage change in housing values on SSRI 
claiming once individuals are eligible. To do so, we estimate the following Probit regressions: 
      
,	 = ΦΔ%
,	 + 
,	 +  +  + 
,																																																1 
 Where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution, 
,	
 in specification (1) is 
an indicator variable equal to one if individual i, living in MSA m, began receiving Social 
Security benefits within one or two years of reaching age 62 in year t.  Δ%
,	
 is the 
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percentage change in house value in the previous two years for individual i, living in MSA m in 
year t.   We use the two-year change in house prices due to the fact that our data, the Health and 
Retirement Survey, is a biannual survey.  We also include controls for individual attributes, 
,	
, 
such as gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, and total non-housing 
wealth, to control for individual heterogeneity. We use state fixed effect   to control for 
unobservable state specific attributes and year fixed effects	 to capture unobservable variables 
that are specific to a given year.  
 However, there are likely to be endogeneity issues present in the simple Probit model.  
Specifically, there are likely to be unobserved local demand shocks that are correlated with 
housing price changes and other sources of income such as waged salaries and the value of other, 
non-housing assets.  For example, if an area is experiencing a recession, this is likely to impact 
both the price of housing and employment opportunities.  Therefore, we believe that a simple 
probit or OLS model will produce biased estimates, as there are likely to be omitted variables in 
the error term.   
 To address this endogeneity issue, we employ an instrumental variables strategy.  For our 
instrument, we use the land topology-based measure of housing supply elasticity introduced by 
Saiz (2010) interacted with the change in the national housing price index. For a given shift in 
housing demand, an MSA with a more inelastic housing supply (i.e. an area with more 
mountains or near water such as New York City, NY or San Francisco, CA) should experience 
large house price changes than the national change in house prices, while MSAs with a more 
elastic housing supply (i.e. flat areas such as Houston, TX) should experience a more modest 
change.  This measure of the supply elasticity is likely to be exogenous to local demand shocks, 
as this is a supply-side measure versus a demand-side measure.  In addition, national house 
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prices are likely to be correlated with local house prices, but not necessarily other local demand 
factors such as the local labor market.  This interaction term has been used previously in the 
literature by Mian and Sufi (2011, 2013, 2014), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) and 
Cvijanovi (2014) as an instrument for changes in local house prices.  
 Therefore, we use the following specification for our first stage regression: 
 Δ%
,	 = Δ% !" × $%&&'	 + (
,	 +  +  + )
,																								2 
where Δ% !" is the percentage change in the national housing price index in the previous two 
years, $%&&'	 is the Saiz (2010) estimate of the housing supply elasticity in MSA m,  is a 
state fixed effect and  represents time fixed effects. ) captures omitted variables in household 
housing wealth change. 
 
5. Data and Summary Statistics 
This study uses restricted access data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1992 to 
2012.  Given that the instrumental variable we employ is at the MSA level, we need to use the 
restricted data to have the necessary geographic detail to conduct our analysis.  The HRS is a 
longitudinal household data set of more than 26,000 Americans over the age of 50 every two 
years. The sample we use in our analysis includes a total of 19,787 individuals after preliminary 
screening.10  
 The HRS data is an extraordinarily rich data set on the retirement decisions and health 
status of the elderly in the United States.  We draw upon a few key variables for our analysis.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics of these variables.  Looking at this table, we see that over 54% 
                                                          
10
 We start with a sample of 37,319 elderly individuals. We exclude 4,969 individuals who report receiving Social 
Security benefits before 62 years old. We also exclude the 706 respondents who report ever receiving disability 
retirement benefits. Further, we include only individuals whom we observe before they turn 60 (two years before the 
eligibility age for pension withdrawal), which causes us to lose another 11,857 respondents.  
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of people claim SSRI benefits within one year of becoming eligible and 64% claim SSRI within 
two years of becoming eligible.  In a given year, 38% of the sample had retired and left the labor 
force.  The average percentage change in housing value over two years is 10%.  However, we see 
in Table 1 that there is a large amount of variation in percentage change in housing values, 
ranging from -65% to 216%. About 54% respondents are female, 86% are white, and 83% are 
married. Older workers with more than ten years of service at in their last job accounts for 35% 
of our sample.  Approximately 56% of the sample has completed high school and 26% have a 
college degree.  
 Controlling for the potential endogeneity of local real estate prices in an SSRI claiming 
decision is important for any researcher interested in causal effects. Following Mian and Sufi 
(2011, 2014), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013), and Cvijanović 
(2014), we instrument for local real estate prices using the interaction between the change in the 
national house price index and the local housing supply elasticity. Local housing supply 
elasticities are provided by Saiz (2010) and are available for 269 MSAs. Saiz (2010) estimates 
land supply elasticities by processing satellite-generated data on elevation and the presence of 
bodies of water.  
 To obtain the national house price index, we use the quarterly index created by the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency.11 We use national house price index rather than MSA house 
price since the latter is likely to be correlated with factors associated with local demand 
conditions, and hence would not be a valid instrument. The identifying assumption of using the 
interaction between the MSA supply elasticity and the change in the national house price index is 
that any deviation from the national trend in house prices is due to differences in the supply 
elasticity of the area, which is not correlated with local demand shocks.  For example, San 
                                                          
11
 http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index-Datasets.aspx#qat. 
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Francisco, CA will experience a more dramatic fall in prices than Houston, TX when national 
house prices fall, not because of local demand factors but because of the ability to supply 
additional housing more easily in Houston than in San Francisco. 
 We then the match MSA and county using the Geographic Correspondence Engine.12 
Given that we use the MSA-level housing supply elasticity as our instrument, we must limit our 
sample to those counties located within an MSA covered by the Saiz (2010) topography-based 
elasticity measure. We also drop households that experienced a percent change in housing prices 
above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile, as well as individuals who didn’t move in 
the previous two years to ensure the full exposure to the change in home equity due to price 
appreciation/depreciation. This reduces the sample to 5,526 individuals within 1,235 counties in 
215 MSAs. 
 
6. Effect of House Price Changes on SSRI Withdrawal 
We begin our analysis by estimating equation (1) using a simple Probit regression.  Results are 
presented in Table 2.  The estimation is conducted separately for the housing boom period and 
the bust period. Column (1) focuses on whether the individuals claim SSRI within one year after 
they turn 62 during the housing boom period (2002 to 2006) while including state fixed effects.  
In column (2), we add year fixed effects to the model. Columns (3) and (4) look at whether an 
individual claims SSBI within two years after turning 62, with column (3) including only state 
fixed effects and column (4) adding year fixed effects.  Columns (5) to (8) follow the same 
structure as columns (1) to (4) but cover the bust period (2007 to 2009).  We report estimated 
coefficient from the Probit model in Panel A and the corresponding marginal effects in Panel B. 
                                                          
12
 http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html. 
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T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 
MSA level. Estimates presented in Table 2 suggest negative but insignificant effect of changes in 
house value on Social Security benefit claiming during the boom period.  However, we see in 
column (5) to (8) that during the bust period, a decline in house price seems to decrease the 
probability of early pension withdrawal. 
 As mentioned above, OLS estimation may suffer from endogeneity issues, as unobserved 
local demand shocks will likely create correlation between house price changes and other local 
labor market conditions.  For example, a negative local demand shock may affect housing market 
outcomes and at the same time cause individuals to delay retirement due to lower wages, which 
may also delay SSRI benefit claiming, suggesting there the Probit model coefficient estimates 
may have an upward bias. To address this issue, we use an instrumental variables approach and 
instrument for house price changes using the interaction between the MSA supply elasticity and 
the change in the national house price index.  Results from the IV regression are presented in 
Table 3, where the columns follow the same structure as in Table 2.  The first stage regression 
results are presented in Panel B and suggest that our instrument is valid.  The Wald test of 
exogeneity rejects the null hypothesis that the change in housing value is an exogenous variable 
in equation (1).   
 Panel A of Table 3 presents the second stage coefficients from our IV regression.  We 
find a significantly negative effect of a change in house price on the likelihood of claiming SSRI 
benefits earlier during the boom period.  This suggests that when house prices increase, elderly 
individuals may delay receiving Social Security benefits, as they may cash out housing equity to 
cover expenses.  Our results indicate that when housing value increases by 10%, the probability 
of claiming SSRI within one year reduced 0.05 once they become eligible and the probability of 
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claiming SSRI within two years reduced 0.06. In contrast, we do not find a statistically 
significant effect during the housing bust period. Estimates reported in column (5) – (8) show 
negative but insignificant effects. This seems to be consistent with cashing-out home equity 
during the boom period as home equity may be a viable substitute for pension withdrawals when 
housing assets appreciate. This channel, however, shuts down when house price declines.   
 
7. Effect of SSRI on Retirement Decision 
We also extend our analysis to examine the effect of a change in house price on the decision to 
retire.  We begin by estimating the effect of changes in house prices on the decision to retirement 
using a Probit model.  These results are presented in Table 4.  Column (1) and (2) focus on the 
effect of a change in housing value on retirement decisions during the housing boom period 
(2002 to 2006), and column (3) to (4) show the effect during the bust period (2007 to 2009).  The 
Probit estimates in Table 4 column (1) and (3) are not statistically significant and are likely to be 
biased due to the endogeneity issue mentioned above.  It is likely that SSRI eligibility will also 
play a role when considering the impact of home equity on the retirement decision.  In this 
regard, we further interact the percent change in house value with a dummy indicating whether 
the respondent meets the eligibility criteria to receive SSRI. We pick up stronger signal in this 
specification, especially for the interaction term.   
 To address potential endogeneity concerns, we conduct similar IV estimation and present 
our results in Table 5.  We find consistent evidence that higher housing values have a positive 
effect on the likelihood of retirement in both the boom and bust period. The coefficients 
estimated for the boom period tend to be of higher magnitude than that of the bust period.  When 
housing value increases 10% (percent), the probability of retirement increases 0.04 during 2002 
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to 2006.  The probability of retirement decreases 0.02, when housing value decreases 10% 
during 2007 to 2009. We think this is consistent with retirement decisions cycling with housing 
market fluctuations. Due to additional channel to cash out home equity during the housing boom 
period, the effect becomes stronger when price appreciates. 
 The coefficients associated with the interaction term between house price appreciation 
and eligibility for pension withdrawal suggest that the impact on retirement mainly comes from 
after the eligibility year during the housing boom period (Table 5 Column (2)).  Before turning 
62, elderly individuals tend not to respond significantly to home equity accumulation in their 
retirement decisions.  However, once they become eligible for receiving SSRI, the elderly may 
decide to retire once they have experience sufficient house price appreciations.  During the 
housing boom period, pension eligibility seems to serve as a safety net in cancelling the negative 
impact of housing price depreciations on early retirement. If house price decreases by 10%, for 
example, the likelihood of retirement for individuals below 62 years old increases 0.04. This 
effect, however, becomes almost zero once they turn 62.  
 
8. Conclusion  
We estimate the impact of changes in housing value on the SSRI claiming and retirement 
decisions.  Simple OLS methods are likely to suffer from omitted variables bias, as changes in 
the price of housing and the decision to withdraw SSRI are likely to be correlated with local 
unobserved demand shocks.  To address this concern, we use the interaction of changes in the 
national house price index and land supply elasticity at the MSA level as an instrument for the 
change in the value of a house.  This instrument has been used previously in the literature, 
allowing us to obtain causal effects. 
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 When we estimate the effect of changes in housing value on the likelihood an individual 
begins receiving SSRI with our instrumental variables approach, we find that as the housing 
price increases by 10% during the boom period, the probability an individual begins to receive 
benefits within one year decreases by 0.05 once they are eligible and the probability of 
individuals claiming SSRI within two years decreases by 0.06.  Meanwhile, we find the 
probability of retirement decrease by 0.04 as housing prices increase 10%.  While the housing 
price decreases 10% during the bust period, the probability of retirement decrease 0.02.  Pension 
eligibility also plays a role on the impact of home equity on retirement. 
 Overall, our findings suggest that the elderly seems to treat home equity and SSRI as 
substitutes when financing retirement.  It appears that most of this trade-off is during boom 
periods, but not when house prices decline.  This is consistent with cashing-out home equity as a 
viable option only when house price appreciates. Furthermore, we see that when house values 
increase, individuals are more likely to retire, possibly because the increase in this asset allows 
them to finance retirement more.  Our findings are important for policy makers in designing 
relevant policies after having a better understanding of the substitutability between these two 
assets. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Withdraw within 1 year 0.5432 0.4982 0 1 
Withdraw within 2 years 0.6431 0.4791 0 1 
Retired 0.3804 0.4855 0 1 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 0.1005  0.3034 -0.6571 2.1634 
Female 0.5390 0.4985 0 1 
White 0.8557 0.3514 0 1 
Married 0.8310 0.3748 0 1 
Tenure one to five years 0.2147 0.4106 0 1 
Tenure five to ten years 0.1138 0.3176 0 1 
Tenure more than ten years 0.3472 0.4761 0 1 
High school 0.5561 0.4969 0 1 
College 0.2559 0.4364 0 1 
Non-housing Wealth 361070 1430634 -814000 90100000 
Self-assessed health status 2.4671 0.9930 1 5 
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Table 2: Probit Regressions - Pension Withdrawal within 1 or 2 years after Becoming Eligible1 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the MSA level) 
 
 2002 – 2006 2007- 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable Withdraw within 1 Year Withdraw within 2 Years Withdraw within 1 Year Withdraw within 2 Years 
Panel A: Probit Regression Coefficient 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years -0.1295 -0.1048 -0.1464* -0.1143 0.5617** 0.7522** 0.5636* 0.8456** 
 (-1.31) (-1.06) (-1.77) (-1.39) (1.99) (2.35) (1.85) (2.35) 
         
         
Panel B: Marginal Effect 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years -0.0441 -0.0357 -0.0485* -0.0374 0.1846** 0.2455** 0.1863* 0.2775** 
 (-1.31) (-1.06) (-1.77) (-1.39) (2.01) (2.39) (1.86) (2.35) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 1600 1600 1578 1578 653 653 640 640 
Log Pseudolikelihood -960.5648 -957.7640 -919.5976 -908.7914 -377.6022 -375.1797 -373.0571 -370.4327 
1
 Other control variables include gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, total non-housing wealth, and self-assessed health. 
 
  
 24
Table 3: IV Probit Regressions - Pension Withdrawal within 1 or 2 Years after Becoming Eligible1 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the MSA level) 
 
 2002 – 2006 2007- 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Second-Stage 
Dependent Variable Withdraw within 1 Year Withdraw within 2 Years Withdraw within 1 Year Withdraw within 2 Years 
 Probit Regression Coefficient 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years -1.0945** -1.5391*** -1.4400*** -1.6462*** -0.1165 -0.2593 -0.3244 -0.3230 
 (-2.14) (-2.74) (-2.82) (-2.83) (-0.19) (-0.44) (-0.56) (-0.55) 
 Marginal Effect 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years -0.3345** -0.5111*** -0.5051*** -0.6254*** -0.0465 -0.1024 -0.1186 -0.1182 
 (-2.14) (-2.73) (-2.79) (-2.83) (-0.19) (-0.45) (-0.56) (-0.55) 
Panel B: First-Stage 
Dependent Variable ∆% in House Value in Previous 2 Years 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years 2.4312*** - 2.3837*** - 2.1927*** - 2.1712*** - 
 (6.81) - (6.68) - (7.38) - (7.46) - 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years × 
MSA land supply elasticity -0.5422*** -0.5118*** -0.5399*** -0.5218*** -0.4695*** -0.4651*** -0.4657*** -0.4659*** 
 (-5.05) (-4.61) (-4.91) (-4.67) (-3.57) (-3.51) (-3.64) (-3.61) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Wald Test of Exogeneity  3.67 4.89 5.56 4.83 3.52 4.32 6.73 6.74 
Observations 1197 1197 1181 1181 486 486 477 477 
Log Pseudolikelihood -955.9601 -951.2390 -885.3643 -874.6170 -90.6797 -88.6880 -85.0922 -85.0911 
1
 Other control variables include gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, total non-housing wealth, and self-assessed health status. 
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Table 4: Probit Regressions - Retirement Decision1 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the MSA level) 
 
 2002 – 2006 2007- 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Retirement Status (1 – retired; 0 - otherwise) 
Panel A: Probit Regression Coefficient 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 0.0148 -0.5891*** 0.0812 -0.0806 
 (0.30) (-5.87) (0.82) (-0.57) 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- 0.8522*** - 0.2556* 
- (8.19) - (1.86) 
Panel B: Marginal Effect 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 0.0045 -0.1777*** 0.02164 -0.0215 
 
(0.30) (-5.97) (0.82) (-0.57) 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- 0.2571*** - 0.0681* 
- (8.50) - (1.87) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Age Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 9125 9125 4113 4113 
Log Pseudolikelihood -4920.2133 -4876.6623 -1954.3837 -1951.8035 
1
 Other control variables include gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, total non-housing wealth, and self-assessed health status. 
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Table 5: IV Probit Regressions - Retirement Decision1 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the MSA level) 
 
 2002 – 2006 2007- 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Second-Stage 
Dependent Variable Retirement Status (1 – retired; 0 - otherwise) 
 Probit Regression Coefficient 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 1.3950*** 0.3128 0.6948*** 1.5902*** 
 (3.55) (0.45) (2.66) (3.14) 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- 1.9046*** - -1.4705** 
- (5.98) - (-2.13) 
 Marginal Effect 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 0.3895*** 0.0847 0.1586*** 0.4072*** 
 (3.55) (0.46) (2.66) (3.12) 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- 0.5157*** - -0.3765*** 
- (5.96) - (-2.13) 
Panel B: First-Stage 
Dependent Variable 
∆% in House Value in 
Previous 2 Years 
∆% in House Value in 
Previous 2 Years 
∆% in HV  
× Eligible for PW 
∆% in House Value in 
Previous 2 Years 
∆% in House Value 
in Previous 2 Years 
∆% in HV 
× Eligible for PW 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years × MSA 
land supply elasticity 
-0.2849** -0.3369*** 0.0271 -0.4085*** -0.3804*** 0.0341 
(-2.33) (-2.76) (0.35) (-3.97) (-3.86) (1.61) 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- -0.1215* 1.7002*** - 0.1276 1.8525*** 
- (-1.70) (10.51) - (0.69) (6.02) 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years × MSA 
land supply elasticity × Eligible for 
Pension Withdrawal 
- 0.0907** -0.3033*** - -0.0493 -0.4444*** 
- (2.07) (-4.26) - (-0.70) (-3.53) 
Wald Test of Exogeneity 9.32 64.13 5.80 8.43 
Observations 6844 6844 2963 2963 
Log Pseudolikelihood -4654.1125 -494.5766 -951.2854 1417.4989 
1
 Other control variables include age, gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, total non-housing wealth, and self-assessed health status. All specifications also include year fixed effects, state 
fixed effects, and age fixed effects. 
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Figure 1: Ratio of Home Equity to Household Net Worth in 2005 and 2011 
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